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1Entrepreneurship, Windfall Gains and Financial Constraints:
The Case of Germany
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the link between entrepreneurship and
¯nancial constraints. We develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model
of an individual utility maximization that predicts that the person is
more likely to start her business when ¯nancial constraints are eased.
We test this hypothesis using German Socio-Economic Panel data
covering the periods 2000{2002 and measure release from ¯nancial
constraints by windfall gains. The estimates con¯rm that the individ-
ual has higher propensity to start her business when she gets windfall
gains. Furthermore, there are stronger e®ects for persons that have
su±cient, but not very high levels of income and abilities.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, windfall gains, ¯nancial constraints.
JEL: G3, J2, L1
21 Introduction
The existence of funding gaps has generated intense debates in both eco-
nomic theory and public policy for more than two decades. Accordingly,
economic scientists have done a great deal of research to study the e®ects
of ¯nancial constraints on entrepreneurship: Do individuals lack the chance
of following their calling to be an entrepreneur because ¯nancial institutions
hold back their funds? In the seminal article Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show
that information asymmetry leads to ine±cient credit rationing. However, in
a dissenting paper de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that information asym-
metry induces over¯nancing for entrepreneurs. Since governments and scien-
tists identi¯ed entrepreneurship as an important source for employment and
growth (Audretsch, 1995), the importance of this discrepancy has increased.1
Governments of various political hues and nationalities spend huge am-
ounts of money to ease ¯nancial restrictions for potential entrepreneurs. For
example, over the years the German Government and the federal states as
well have launched a large variety of equity and debt programs to foster
entrepreneurship. The programs include partial coverage of the ¯nancier's
default risk by the state, interest subsidies and direct investment of state-
owned ¯nancial institution. In 2003 the \Ich AG" program started which
grants unemployed entrepreneurs 14400 Euros over a period of three years. In
2004 the German Government launched the \ERP-EIF Dachfonds"2, a fund
1The European Commission considers entrepreneurship as a crucial element for
achieving the political objectives set at the European Council Meeting in Lisbon, see
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/.
2ERP and EIF are the abbreviations for European Recovery Program and European
Investment Fund respectively.
3of funds that provides 500 Mio. Euro for equity-investments in high-tech
start-ups. Furthermore, a 240 Mio. Euro state-owned fund was established
which directly invests in newly founded ¯rms.
The recent literature does not give a uniform answer to the question
whether entrepreneurs are ¯nancially constrained.3 Theoretical and empir-
ical results of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989)
suggest a positive relationship between starting an own business and wealth.
However, Cressy (2000) shows that this positive correlation may simply re-
°ect a decreasing absolute risk aversion. Wealthy individuals have a higher
inclination to take on risky assets such as starting their own businesses.
Empirical research on ¯nancial constraints for entrepreneurs has to deal
with two major pitfalls. First, ¯nancial constraints cannot be measured
directly.4 Second, wealth as the most common proxy for the release from
¯nancial constraints may be endogenously determined.5 Xu (1998) shows
that individuals considering potential self{employment accumulate wealth
prior to their decision to switch into self employment. Cressy (1999) argues
that wealth is an indicator of the individual's ability. In another paper,
Cressy (1996) ¯nds no relationship between the access to bank ¯nance and
wealth for entrepreneurs of comparable ability.
To control for these e®ects and make results more consistent empirical re-
3We use self-employment and entrepreneurship interchangeable.
4Some studies use personal reports of entrepreneurs about ¯nancial constraints. How-
ever, reported constraints are also an imperfect measure of frictions in the ¯nancing mar-
kets, since they do not reveal whether the rejection is due to ability estimations by the
bank or asymmetric information.
5The banking literature suggests that personal wealth is the most natural candidate
for proxiing the relaxation of ¯nancial constraints as it can serve as equity or collateral,
see for example Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987).
4search can take two approaches: ¯rst, exogenous increase in wealth might be
employed as proxy for the release from ¯nancial constraints. Second, instead
of testing for di®erences between groups of individuals the e®ect might be
tested for a group of individuals having the same or similar characteristics.
Most studies focus on avoiding the endogeneity problem. Blanch°ower and
Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) use inheritance
as an exogenous increase in wealth. Black, de Meza and Je®reys (1996)
investigate the impact of an increase in housing prices in the U.K. on the
number of business registrations nationwide. Although a positive relation-
ship between these indicators and entrepreneurship is found, the validity of
the results may be questioned. The studies lack to test whether such a re-
lation also exists for individuals that are otherwise fairly similar, but di®er
with respect to wealth increase. Following the path of Black et al. (1996) for
the U.S.A, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) ¯nd no relationship between business
entry and housing capital gains over most wealth groups. Only for the top
5 % wealthiest people the increase in ¯nancial resources via housing market
gains had a signi¯cant impact on entrepreneurship.
Windfall gains or unexpected payments are a more appropriate proxy for
exogenous wealth increases than housing capital gains. Nonetheless, research
on how windfalls a®ect the propensity to become entrepreneur is limited so
far. By analyzing Swedish micro data Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) ¯nd that
the probability of being self-employed increases when people receive windfall
gains in the form of inheritance and lottery winnings. Similarly, Taylor (1999)
uses U.K. panel data from the British Household Panel (BHPS) to ¯nd that
the type of windfalls matters. Redundancy payments increase but job{related
5bonus payments decrease the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. These
non{uniform results point again to the necessity of controlling for the windfall
receiver's type by forming groups of individuals that are fairly comparable
except for their level of exogenous wealth increase.
In our paper we want to contribute to this debate by formulating a dy-
namic partial equilibrium model of a representative individual's utility maxi-
mization problem and test it with German data. For that purpose, we use an
unbalanced panel of individuals obtained from the German Socio{Economic
Panel (GSOEP) database, a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study
of private households which includes about more than 40,000 individual{year
observations during 2000-2002. We also consider sample splits de¯ning cate-
gories of individuals by income and abilities quartiles. The lifting of ¯nancial
constraints is measured by windfall gains.
Our empirical conclusions are clear and appear robust to a number of
alternative econometric speci¯cations. We ¯nd that ¯nancial frictions indeed
exist in Germany. Our results also highlight considerable variation across
income and ability quartiles. Potential entrepreneurs living in households
with an upper-medium wealth level and potential entrepreneurs with medium
ability have higher sensitivity to an unexpected wealth gain.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 develops the
theoretical model. Section 3 gives a description of the data employed and il-
lustrates the econometrical model. Finally, Section 4 concludes and proposes
areas of further research.
62 Theoretical Model
In this section we develop a simple expected utility model of risk{neutral
individual's behavior. Consider a person who divides her total available time
of working ¹ L between her own business activity Lt, and time of working for
somebody else, ¹ L ¡ Lt. Her utility is a linear function of consumption, Ct,
and work (Lt; ¹ L¡Lt). · and ¶ are disutility coe±cients of working. ¯ is the
discount factor. We assume a strict preference for consumption in the present
period. The present value of a gain in the future from saving in period t is
less than the loss in utility from foregone consumption in period t. E0 is the









Ct ¡ ·Lt ¡ ¶(¹ L ¡ Lt)
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5(IT ¡ ST) = 0 (5)
The individual maximizes equation (1) subject to three constraints.7 The
¯rst de¯nes the person's consumption. Yt denotes pro¯ts of the individual
if he is self-employed, It is investment prepared for the next period, wt is
wage if the person is employed by somebody else, It¡1 ¡ St¡1 and It ¡ St is
borrowing done in the previous period and in the current period, St denotes
savings in period t, It denotes investment in t, and rbt is gross interest rate for
6For simplicity we assume that total hours of work are constant for every period.
7See also models developed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Petrova (2004), Buera
(2003).
7borrowing. The amount of expenses in t, Ct +It, has to equalize the amount
of in°ows coming from return on entrepreneurship, wage income, borrowing
and interest payment for previous borrowing.
The second constraint is the person's expected income in the case of self-
employment, where µ is a measure of \entrepreneurial abilities", 0 < ® < 1,
0 < ° < 1, It is investment in the business, and » is a log{normal disturbance
whose logarithm has variance ¾2
» and E(») = 1. At the time when investment
decision is made, the risk{neutral person does not know the realization of ».
Financial frictions are introduced through the third constraint, (It¡St) ·
f(St) and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier ¸t. f(St) is the borrowing
capacity. At time t the person can borrow not more than f(St), where St
is the saving and f0(St) > 0. If the planned borrowing, It ¡ St, exceeds the
borrowing capacity the constraint holds as equality, It ¡St = f(St), and the
individual is ¯nancially constrained.
The phenomenon of borrowing capacity falling behind the desired bor-
rowing level may be due to the fact that lenders limit their downside risk by
binding the amount of credit on the borrower's lending capacity. Lending
capacity is determined by St which can also be interpreted as the amount of
equity that the potential entrepreneur puts into his business.
Equation (5) is the transversality condition which prevents the person
from borrowing an in¯nite amount and consuming it. Solving the optimiza-
tion problem we derive the following ¯rst{order conditions for investment,










t = ¸t=¯ + rbt+1
8¸t =
1 ¡ ¯ rbt+1
(f0(St) + 1)
:
Given the strict preference for current consumption as de¯ned above, ¯ rbt+1 <
1 and ¸t > 0. If ¯nancial constraints ease, that is if f0(St) increases, then
¸t decreases. Note that in the absence of ¯nancial constraints, when ¸t = 0,
the individual invests until marginal product of capital equals interest rate
for borrowing. However, in case of ¸t > 0, It marginal product of capital
exceeds interest rate.
The optimal values of invested capital and hours spend in self{employment























Intuition suggests that the individual would change the hours devoted to
her business when the degree of ¯nancial constraints changes. As shown
in equation (8) below, when the level of ¯nancial constraints decreases, the






1 ¡ ° ¡ ®
"



















µ® [rbt + ¸t¡1=¯]
1
°¡1 > 0:
The negative relationship between ¯nancial constraints and time spend in
start{up business is due to an opportunity cost e®ect. If ¯nancial constraints
9are eased the increased level of investment generates a gap between the mar-
ginal return and the marginal opportunity costs of entrepreneurship. By
increasing the time spend in start-up business the individual equalizes both
again.
As a measure of ¯nancial constraints we employ a windfall gain proxy.
The intuitive reason is that windfalls provide the would{be entrepreneur
with additional money that is neither dependent on his ability nor on his
accumulated wealth. Being exogenous, windfall gains have the e®ect of in-
dependently relaxing ¯nancial constraints and increasing the propensity to
enter entrepreneurship if such constraints exist. Thus, taking the argument
in reverse, for similar groups of individuals a positive dependence between
the propensity to enter entrepreneurship and the exogenous windfall proxy
proves that ¯nancial constraints limit entrepreneurship.
On the basis of our theoretical predictions, the individual i becomes an
entrepreneur at time t if Lit > 0. We estimate the following speci¯cation of
the reduced form self{employment selection equation
Lit = ¤(±¸it¡1 + ºZit + Xi + "it) (9)
where i indexes individuals, t corresponds to periods, Lit is a dummy variable
equal to one if the person decided to be self{employed in the next period and
zero otherwise, ¸it¡1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the person got
windfall gains and zero otherwise in the previous period, Zit is a vector of
the person speci¯c variables, Xt is a set of time dummies, and ¤ is the c.d.f.
of the logistic distribution.
The vector Zit includes several characteristics of the individual. The
10dummy variable sex is equal to one, if the person is female and zero oth-
erwise. The variable age represents the age of the individual, and agesq is
the squared version of age. For indicating the person's roots germborn is
used. The variable is equal to one if the person is born in Germany or is
immigrated before 1948 and zero otherwise. The variable married provides
information about the marital status, it is equal to one if the individual is
married and lives together with the partner and it is zero otherwise. This
variable characterizes some kind of a typical family background. hhsize is a
variable that includes the number of persons living in the particular house-
hold. Finally we employ three dummy variables, which re°ect the person's
level of education or training (in years). High school education level is rep-
resented by educ2. It ranges from 10 to 13 years. educ3 ranging from 14 to
16 years indicates (school)graduation and some kind of apprenticeship and
educ4 (17 to 18 years) is the indicator for university studies.
We employ panel data random-e®ects logistic regression for estimating
the econometric model. Using panel data approach allows to control for the
cluster e®ects that produces robust results. Furthermore, on the basis of




We work with the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) database, a wide-
ranging representative longitudinal study of private households. It provides
11information on all household members, consisting of Germans living in the
Old and the New German States, foreigners, and recent immigrants to Ger-
many. The Panel started in 1984. In 2003, there were more than 12,000
households, and nearly 24,000 persons sampled. Windfall gains are de¯ned
as inheritance, donations and lottery winnings. The information of windfall
gains is not available for all years. In our research we use data for years
2000{2002 that contains about 20,000 individual characteristics annually.8
We also apply a number of selection criteria to the data. First, we drop
all unemployed people from our analysis. Second, we excluded individuals
older than 65 and younger then 20 years old. Descriptive statistics for the
annual means of all variables employed in the analysis are described in Table
1. From Table 1 we see that about one percent of individuals started their
own businesses, and 3 percent of individuals received windfall gains.
In our analysis of subsamples of individuals, we focus on the applicability
of the general model to a group of similar persons rather than testing for
di®erences between groups of individuals, which would impose the constraints
across these groups.
First, we investigate the e®ects of ¯nancial constraints on entrepreneur-
ship by wealth quartiles. Descriptive statistics by income quartile are de-
scribed in Table 2. We can see that about one percent of individuals be-
comes self{employed. Moreover, richer people are likely to get their wealth
from windfall gains.
Second, we categorize individuals by abilities. We proxy the individual's
8The data for windfall gains is available for 2000{2003. However, we excluded 2003
because in this year a new law aiming at promoting small entrepreneurship substantially
changed the incentives to enter self-employment.
12abilities as individual speci¯c term from the following regression
Incomeit = ®0 + ®1educit + ®2experit + ®3marriedit + ®4sexit
+®5ageit + ®6age
2
it + ui + "it
where i is individual index, t is time index, Incomeit is total household
income, educit is the amount of education or training in years, experit is the
length of time with ¯rm in years, marriedit, sexit, ageit and age2
it is de¯ned
as before. Finally ui is an individual speci¯c term which can be interpreted
as a proxy of the person's abilities.9 Descriptive statistic by abilities quartiles
is described in Table 3.
3.2 Econometric Results
In this section we present the estimation results on the link between the
propensity of being self{employed and windfall gains. Based on the pre-
diction of the dynamic partial equilibrium model, we hypothesize that indi-
viduals are more likely to start their businesses when they get unexpected
wealth.
The results of estimating Equation (9) are given in Tables 4-6. Table
4 presents results from regressions of self{employment dummy variable on
windfall gains and our control variables for sex, household size, age, age
squared, marriage, education and origin.
Five di®erent regression models are presented. In model (1), we examine
the correlation between propensity of being self{employed and windfall gains,
controlling just for sex. In model (2) we also control for age and age squared.
9See Griliches (1977) for more details.
13Place of birth and marriage are controlled for in model (3). Finally, we
control for household size and education in models (4) and (5), respectively.
The results indicate that the propensity of becoming an entrepreneur
increases if the person gets a windfall gain. The coe±cient on windfall
varies from 0.498 in model (2) and signi¯cant at the 5 % level to 0.448 in
model (5) and signi¯cant at the 10 % level. Moreover, women are less likely
to start their own businesses. This is also found in Lindh and Ohlsson (1996).
Table 5 reports results for the four income quartiles of individuals. For
each quartile, we report just estimates of model (5). The results vary dra-
matically. The poorest people in the sample are not a®ected by windfall
gains. They are more likely to start a busines when they are getting older.
Moreover, household size and university education also have a positive e®ect
on their propensity of starting own businesses. The model is not successful
for the second income quartile, even though there is positive, but statistically
insigni¯cant relationship between windfall gains and entrepreneurship. Pos-
itive and statistically signi¯cant relationship between entrepreneurship and
windfall gains is observed for the third income quartile. The coe±cient on
windfall is 0.950 compared to 0.448 for all individuals. Finally, the results
for the forth quartile indicate that \the very rich" people are less likely to
start their own business when they get windfall gains. Moreover, there are
negative and statistically signi¯cant coe±cients on education dummies and
sex.
Thus, depending on the level of income, windfall gains have a distinct
impact on self{employment. Our results support Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
who ¯nd that the propensity to become a business owner in the United States
14is a non{linear function of wealth. However, they concluded that only at the
top of the wealth distribution there is a positive and signi¯cant relationship
between wealth and entrepreneurship, whereas our own study identi¯es only
the group of individuals with an upper-medium wealth level as sensitive to
exogenous wealth increases.
We also ¯nd an interesting di®erence in the results for ability quartiles
reported in Table 6. The positive and statistically signi¯cant relationship
between entrepreneurship and windfall gains is observed for the second ability
quartile. The coe±cient on windfall gain variable is 1.228 comparing to
0.448 for all individuals. Interestingly, a negative relationship between the
same factors is observed for the forth quartile. This might be interpreted
as the best abilities' people do not have any ¯nancial constraints and could
get su±cient funds without obstacles. The people from the second ability
quartile have enough skills, but lack funds to start their businesses. The
insigni¯cant positive relationship for the ¯rst quartile can be explained by
the fact that these people do not have enough skills to start own business.
In summary, we ¯nd clear support for the hypothesis of Equation (8).
Individuals are more likely to start their businesses when they get windfall
gains. The results di®er for di®erent income and ability quartiles. The wind-
fall gains have much higher e®ect on the propensity of being self{employed
when a person has su±cient levels of abilities and income. However, \too
rich" and \too smart" people do not face any ¯nancial constraints.10
10In the case of Italy Colombo, Delmastro and Grilli (2004) conclude that only su±-
ciently able entrepreneurs are ¯nancially constrained.
154 Conclusions
The paper explores the link between the probability of starting an own busi-
ness and windfall gains by analyzing longitudinal data from the German
Socio Economic Panel. Based on theoretical predictions we expect that in-
dividuals are more likely to start their businesses when ¯nancial constraints
are released. In order to empirically test our theoretical model we employ
windfall gains as an exogenous measure for the release from ¯nancial con-
straints. The results suggest positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ects of
windfall gains on entrepreneurship for German individuals during 2000{2002.
There are signi¯cant di®erences in the results for di®erent income and
ability quartiles, though. Windfall gains have positive and statistically sig-
ni¯cant e®ects on the propensity of being self-employed if a person possesses
a certain level of ability and earns su±cient but not a very high income.
Policy-wise these results imply that state programs promoting start{up
creation need to be re¯ned. In particular, our research suggests that such
programs should concentrate more on speci¯c target groups. An appropriate
design of programs requires that promotion is bound on personal character-
istics of potential entrepreneurs.
The natural next step in our line of research is the investigation of how
windfall gains a®ect the survival of the entrepreneur's business. If windfalls
in°uence the fate of the business as well, then ¯nancial constraints do not only
exist prior to entrepreneurship but also during the lifetime of the business.
Given that ¯nancial constraints are a result of asymmetric information such
an investigation would also give some clues about how e®ectively banks learn
16their clients' type during a ¯nancing relationship. Furthermore, since the
existence of ¯nancial constraints and the e±ciency of a certain policy design
is probably linked to the ¯nancial system a country employs, cross-country
studies on ¯nancial constraints and entrepreneurship are in order.
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19Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All ¯rms ¹ ¾2 p25 p50 p75 N
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 41234
windfall 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 40938
germborn 0.86 0.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 40650
married 0.71 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00 41226
sex 0.51 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 41234
age 41.22 105.88 33.00 41.00 49.00 41234
hhsize 3.14 3.61 2.00 3.00 4.00 41234
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, N is sample size, while
¾2 and ¹ represent its variance and mean respectively.
20Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by income quartiles
¹ ¾2 p25 p50 p75 N
Income 1
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 9658
windfall 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 9613
Income 2
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 10457
windfall 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 10392
Income 3
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 10263
windfall 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 10202
Income 4
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8925
windfall 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 8811
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, N is sample size, while
¾2 and ¹ represent its variance and mean respectively.
21Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by ability quartiles
¹ ¾2 p25 p50 p75 N
Ability 1
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8809
windfall 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 8762
Ability 2
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8750
windfall 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 8706
Ability 3
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8632
windfall 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 8574
Ability 4
self{employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 7784
windfall 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 7690
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, N is sample size, while
¾2 and ¹ represent its variance and mean respectively.
22Table 4: Individual logit results for the full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
windfallit¡1 0.479** 0.498** 0.489** 0.491** 0.448*
[0.242] [0.242] [0.243] [0.243] [0.243]
sexit -0.433*** -0.445*** -0.440*** -0.437*** -0.426***
[0.108] [0.108] [0.108] [0.108] [0.108]
ageit 0.026 0.036 0.044 0.033
[0.040] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043]
age2
it -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
germbornit 0.141 0.158 0.162
[0.163] [0.164] [0.171]










N 40938 40938 40349 40349 40349
Log likelihood -2116.351 -2104.321 -2098.477 -2097.750 -2093.998
Â2 39.920 61.420 61.986 63.591 71.105
Note: Every equation includes constant and time dummy variables. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; ***
signi¯cant at 1%.
23Table 5: Individual logit results by income quartiles
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
windfallit¡1 0.017 0.296 0.950** -0.033
[1.019] [0.594] [0.375] [0.482]
germbornit 0.010 -0.323 0.299 0.086
[0.320] [0.311] [0.443] [0.430]
marriedit -0.133 -0.207 -0.051 0.123
[0.294] [0.263] [0.254] [0.273]
sexit -0.371 -0.398* -0.350 -0.701**
[0.254] [0.228] [0.215] [0.225]
ageit 0.262** 0.244** -0.054 -0.047
[0.120] [0.117] [0.082] [0.087]
age2
it -0.003** -0.004** 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
hhsizeit 0.083* 0.047 0.049 -0.012
[0.050] [0.049] [0.054] [0.069]
educ2it 0.278 0.379 -0.206 -1.360***
[0.377] [0.449] [0.400] [0.358]
educ3it 0.569 0.633 -0.118 -1.343***
[0.488] [0.496] [0.454] [0.398]
educ4it 1.359** 0.747 0.450 -1.457***
[0.582] [0.601] [0.468] [0.406]
N 9601 10375 10109 8445
Log likelihood -371.630 -458.166 -543.934 -546.578
Â2 24.074 23.859 32.277 33.890
Note: Every equation includes constant and time dummy variables. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; ***
signi¯cant at 1%.
24Table 6: Individual logit results by ability quartiles
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
windfallit¡1 0.312 1.228*** 0.580 -0.906
[0.726] [0.422] [0.475] [0.731]
germbornit -0.285 0.569 -0.392 -0.263
[0.330] [0.423] [0.346] [0.391]
marriedit -0.347 0.395 0.091 0.187
[0.287] [0.296] [0.273] [0.273]
sexit -0.241 0.109 -0.074 -0.845***
[0.254] [0.232] [0.227] [0.242]
ageit 0.090 0.038 0.052 -0.007
[0.114] [0.104] [0.094] [0.089]
age2
it -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
hhsizeit 0.010 0.081 0.091* 0.039
[0.063] [0.049] [0.053] [0.060]
educ2it 0.582 0.094 1.282** -0.142
[0.746] [0.460] [0.615] [0.441]
educ3it 0.892 0.686 1.072 0.041
[0.760] [0.515] [0.675] [0.490]
educ4it 1.297* 0.782 1.158 0.163
[0.780] [0.556] [0.723] [0.511]
N 8730 8675 8505 7390
Log likelihood -380.573 -433.821 -459.867 -502.229
Â2 22.936 31.474 12.688 23.958
Note: Every equation includes constant and time dummy variables. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; ***
signi¯cant at 1%.
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